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THE LOGIC OF RECIPROCITY: TRUST, 
COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND LAW 
Dan M. Kahan* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Logic of Collective Action1 has for decades supplied the logic 
of public-policy analysis. In this pioneering application of public 
choice theory, Mancur Olson elegantly punctured the premise -
shared by a variety of political theories - that individuals can be 
expected to act consistently with the interest of the groups to which 
they belong. Absent externally imposed incentives, wealth-maximizing 
individuals, he argued, will rarely find it in their interest to contribute 
to goods that benefit the group as a whole, but rather will "free ride" 
on the contributions that other group members make. As a result, too 
few individuals will contribute sufficiently, and the well-being of the 
group will suffer.2 These assumptions dominate public-policy analysis 
and public policy itself across a host of regulatory domains - from tax 
collection to environmental conservation, from street-level policing to 
policing of the internet. 
But as a wealth of social science evidence now makes clear, 
Olson's Logic is false. In collective-action settings, individuals adopt 
not a materially calculating posture but rather a richer, more emotion­
ally nuanced reciprocal one. When they perceive that others are 
behaving cooperatively, individuals are moved by honor, altruism, and 
like dispositions to contribute to public goods even without the in­
ducement of material incentives. When, in contrast, they perceive that 
others are shirking or otherwise taking advantage of them, individuals 
are moved by resentment and pride to withhold their own cooperation 
and even to engage in personally costly forms of retaliation. 
This set of dynamics - which I propose to refer to as the "logic of 
reciprocity" - suggests not only an alternative account of when 
collective-action problems will arise, but also an alternative program 
for solving (or simply avoiding) them through law. Whereas the con-
* Elizabeth K. Dollard Professor of Law, Yale Law School. B.A. 1986, Middlebury; J.D. 
1989, Harvard. - Ed. I am grateful to Herbert Giatir and to workshop participants from 
Seaton Hall Law School, the University of Southern California Law School, and Harvard 
Law School for comments. 
1. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). 
2. See id. at 1-2. 
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ventional logic of collective action counsels the creation of appropriate 
external incentives, the logic of reciprocity suggests the importance of 
promoting trust. Individuals who have faith in the willingness of others 
to contribute their fair share will voluntarily respond in kind. And 
spontaneous cooperation of this sort breeds more of the same, as indi­
viduals observe others contributing to public goods and are moved to 
reciprocate. In this self-sustaining atmosphere of trust, reliance on 
costly incentive schemes becomes less necessary. By the same token, 
individuals who lack faith in their peers can be expected to resist con­
tributing to public goods, thereby inducing still others to withhold 
their cooperation as a means of retaliating. In this self-sustaining 
atmosphere of distrust, even strong (and costly) regulatory incentives 
are likely to be ineffective in promoting desirable behavior. 
Indeed, such incentives may well undermine the conditions of trust 
necessary to hold collective-action problems at bay. Conspicuous 
rewards and punishments can imply that others aren't inclined to 
cooperate voluntarily, a message that predictably weakens individuals' 
commitment to contributing to public goods. In addition, incentive 
schemes tend to mask the extent to which individuals are inclined to 
contribute to public goods voluntarily, thereby weakening the 
tendency of observable cooperation to generate reciprocal coopera­
tion by others. In short, manipulating material incentives may not only 
be an inefficient regulatory strategy for solving collective-action 
problems; it may often be a self-defeating one. 
This Essay will elaborate upon and apply these claims. It begins by 
distilling from the reciprocity literature a set of behavioral dynamics 
pertinent to societal collective-action problems. It then shows how 
these dynamics can be used to analyze and improve policymaking in 
various regulatory fields, with a particular emphasis on tax compli­
ance, the siting of noxious facilities, the production of ideas and tech­
nology, and the policing of street crime. 
II. THE LOGIC OF RECIPROCITY 
Accepted for decades on a combination of faith and anecdote, the 
premises of the conventional theory of collective action have only 
recently been subjected to sustained and rigorous empirical examina­
tion. This research suggests an alternative theory - the logic of reci­
procity - that differs from the conventional position in four impor­
tant respects, each of which merits specific attention. 
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FIGURE! 
Two Theories of Collective Action 
Conventional Theory Reciprocity Theory 
Individual Actors 
Rational wealth maximizers Emotional/moral reciprocators 
Collective Behavior Unique Equilibrium Multiple Equilibria 
Regulatory Policy Incentives Trust 
Variability of Preferences Homogeneous Heterogeneous 
A. Agents: Wealth Maximizers vs. Emotional/Moral Reciprocators 
The first pair of contrasting elements in Figure 1 relates to the 
nature of individuals' utility functions. The conventional theory 
assumes that individuals in collective-action settings - ones that take 
the form of a standard prisoner's dilemma - behave like wealth 
maximizers. That is, they refuse to contribute to collective goods and 
instead free ride on the contributions made by others, who, as wealth 
maximizers, also contribute nothing. The reciprocity theory, in 
contrast, sees individuals as moral and emotional reciprocators. M ost 
persons think of themselves and want to be understood by others as 
cooperative and trustworthy and are thus willing to contribute their 
fair share to securing collective goods. By the same token, most indi­
viduals loathe being taken advantage of. Accordingly, if they perceive 
that most other individuals are shirking, they too hold back to avoid 
feeling (or being) exploited. 
Individuals who care only about maximizing their wealth are at 
best weak reciprocators. If a rational wealth maximizer anticipates that 
she will be engaged in repeat transactions with another identifiable 
agent over a sufficiently long period of time under circumstances 
where both can observe and keep track of one another's actions, then 
her best strategy is to reward cooperation with cooperation and defec­
tion with defection in a "tit for tat" pattern.3 Emotional and moral 
reciprocators, in contrast, are strong reciprocators: they will condition 
their contributions to collective goods on the contributions of others 
even in fleeting transactions with multiple actors whose behavior they 
cannot keep track of and whose identities they can't even discern. 
3. This conclusion is elegantly demonstrated by a variety of different means in ROBERT 
AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). 
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The prevalence of this sort of strong reciprocity is supported by a 
considerable body of evidence. Much of it is experimental in nature. 
So-called "public-goods experiments" - laboratory constructs 
designed to simulate collective-action problems - have consistently 
shown that the willingness of individuals to make costly contributions 
to collective goods is highly conditional on their perception that others 
are willing to do so.4 Empirical studies of real-world behavior corrobo­
rate this finding. For example, individuals have been shown to recip­
rocate the disposition of others to give (or not) to charity, 5 to refrain 
(or not) from littering,6 and to wait their tum (or not) in lines.7 Indeed, 
individuals behave like reciprocators even in markets: econometric 
and other forms of field research, for example, suggest that when firms 
compensate their workers more generously workers reciprocate by 
voluntarily working harder.8 
B. Collective Behavior: Unique vs. Multiple Equilibria 
The second pair of contrasts concerns collective behavior. In typi­
cal collective-action settings, the conventional theory treats defection 
or free riding as the dominant strategy for every individual. Accord­
ingly, that theory predicts a single collective behavioral equilibrium: 
universal noncooperation. 
Under the reciprocity theory, in contrast, there is no "dominant" 
individual strategy. Individuals prefer to contribute if they believe 
others are inclined to contribute, but to free ride if they believe others 
are inclined to free ride. 
4. See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Reciprocity and Economics: The Economic Impli­
cations of Homo Reciprocans, 42 E UR. ECON. REV. 845 (1998). 
5. See Peter H. Reingen, Test of a List Procedure for Inducing Compliance with a Re­
quest to Donate Money, 67 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 110 (1982); see also ROBERT B. CIALDINI, 
INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 96-97 (3d ed. 1993) (describing techniques used to 
create impressions of widespread charitable giving). 
6. See ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 29-30 (Richard C. Atkinson et al. eds., 
7th ed. 1995); Robert B. Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: Recycling the 
Concept of Norms to Reduce Littering in Public Places, 58 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. 
PSYCHOL. 1015 (1990). 
7. See Stanley Milgram et al., Response to Intrusion into Waiting Lines, 51 J. 
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 683 (1986) (summarizing experiments finding that indi­
viduals standing in line will defend against intruders under a variety of conditions); Bernd H. 
Schmitt et al., Intrusions into Waiting Lines: Does the Queue Constitute a Social System?, 63 
J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 806 (1992) (same). 
8. See George A. Akerlof, Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange, 97 Q.J. ECON. 543 
(1982); WILLIAM T. DICKENS & LAWRENCE F. KATZ, INTER-INDUSTRY WAGE 
DIFFERENCES AND THEORIES OF WAGE DETERMINATION 25-26 (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 2271, 1987); Lawrence F. Katz & Lawrence H. Summers, In­
dustry Rents: Evidence and Implications, in 1989 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, 
MICROECONOMICS 209. See generally EFFICIENCY WAGE MODELS OF THE LABOR MARKET 
(George A. Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen eds., 1986). 
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Such interdependencies tend to generate patterns of collective 
behavior characterized by multiple equilibria punctuated by tipping 
points.9 If, for whatever reason, some individuals conclude that those 
around them are inclined to contribute, they'll respond by contribut­
ing in kind, prompting still others to contribute, and so forth and so on 
until a highly cooperative state of affairs takes root. But if some indi­
viduals conclude that others are free riding, then they will respond by 
free riding too, spurring others to do the same, and so forth and so on 
until mass noncooperation becomes the norm. 
This dynamic, too, has been empirically documented. In multi­
round public-goods experiments, for example, contribution levels tend 
to migrate steadily toward or away from the social optimum depend­
ing on whether subjects behaved relatively cooperatively or noncoop­
eratively early on.1 0  Scholars have also documented that the incidence 
9. These patterns can be illustrated graphically. 




Multiple Equilibria and Tipping Points 
40 so 60 100 
% contributing in t,, 
In this particular representation, there are three equilibria. One (selected arbitrarily for 
illustration) is around 50%: if participants in a collective-action setting perceive that about 
half of the other participants are contributing in the period t� then about half will choose to 
contribute in the period t •• 1• which means that about that many will contribute in the period 
t •• 1. and so forth and so on. But this middle equilibrium is relatively unstable. If as a result of 
some exogenous shock, more than 50% are induced to contribute in t. (say, 60%), then an 
even higher percentage than that will be willing to contribute in t •• 1 (70% ), leading to a still 
higher percentage in t •• ,, and so forth and so on until contribution levels top out at the high­
cooperation equilibrium at the upper-right-hand comer. Similarly, if for some reason less 
than 50% contribute in t. (say, 40%), then an even smaller percentage will contribute in t •• , 
(30%), leading to a lower contribution level in t •• 1, and so forth and so on until contributions 
bottom out at the low-cooperation equilibrium at the lower-left-hand comer. The comer 
equilibria, moreover, are relatively stable: exogenous shocks may result in temporary boosts 
or drops in contributions but unless they are big enough to push the contribution level back 
across the 50% tipping point, collective behavior will quickly settle back into the comer 
equilibrium from which it started. See generally THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES 
AND MACROBEHAVIOR (1978) (developing formal model of tipping points and feedback 
effects); Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to the 
Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225 (1997) (same). 
10. See generally Armin Falk & Urs Fischbacher, A Theory of Reciprocity (Feb. 1999) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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of littering, recycling, smoking in public, safe sex, and other types of 
behavior that affect collective welfare are likewise subject to feedback 
effects and multiple equilibria - generating dramatic variations in 
their incidence across space and over time.U 
C. Promoting Cooperation: Incentives vs. Trust 
The third contrast between the conventional theory of collective 
action and the logic of reciprocity has to do with policy prescriptions. 
The conventional theory sees incentives as the solution to collective­
action problems: because wealth maximizers can't be counted on to 
contribute to public goods, they must be prodded to do so with either 
rewards or punishments that align their individual and collective inter­
ests. 
The reciprocity theory suggests an alternative policy, namely, the 
promotion of trust. If individuals can be made to believe that others 
are inclined to contribute to public goods, then they can be induced to 
contribute in turn, even without recourse to incentives. When permit­
ted to communicate during play, for example, subjects in multiround 
public-goods experiments tend to assure one another that they'll con­
tribute rather than free ride. Although unenforceable, such assurances 
do in fact prompt subjects to make larger contributions, which they 
quickly increase toward the social optimum as they observe others 
doing the same.12 In sum, face-to-face assurance giving builds trust, 
which in turn generates reciprocal cooperation. 
Indeed, field and laboratory research suggests that incentives, far 
from solving collective-action problems, can sometimes actually 
magnify them by dissipating trust. The simple existence of an incentive 
scheme can be seen as a cue that other individuals are not inclined to 
cooperate voluntarily: if they were, incentives would be unnecessary. 
This inference can in turn trigger a reciprocal disposition to withhold 
voluntary cooperation and thereby undercut, if not wholly displace, 
the force of the incentive. In addition, the existence of incentives can 
mask voluntary contributions to public goods, thereby diluting the 
power of such contributions to trigger reciprocal cooperation. Relat­
edly, incentives can crowd out dispositions such as altruism by extin-
11 .  See, e.g. , Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 
947, 976-77 (1997) (discussing smoking and compliance with "pooper scooper" laws); Timur 
Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 
687-89, 746 (1999) (discussing safe sex, smoking, and environmental concerns); Cass R. Sun­
stein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2033-36 (1996) (discuss­
ing smoking, unsafe sex, firearm use, and other forms of risk-creating behavior). 
12. See John 0. Ledyard, Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 1 1 1 ,  156-58 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth 
eds., 1995); Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 137, 146 (2000). 
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guishing the opportunity of individuals to demonstrate (to themselves 
and to others) that they are willing to sacrifice material gain for the 
public good. And if, for any of these reasons, the advent of a material 
incentive induces even a few individuals to contribute less to a public 
good, reciprocity dynamics will likely induce still others to contribute 
less, thereby inducing others to do the same, and so forth and so on 
until collective behavior settles into a new, noncooperative equilib­
rium - one that is likely to be impervious to the subsequent removal 
of material incentives.13 
It would be a mistake, though, to conclude that material incentives 
invariably diminish trust. They are most likely to have that effect, 
research suggests, when individuals start out with the belief that most 
other individuals are inclined to contribute to some public good volun­
tarily; it's when individuals expect voluntary cooperation that the ad­
vent of material incentives creates the greatest risk of adverse cueing, 
masking, and crowding out. But the situation will likely be different if 
individuals start out with the belief that most other individuals are 
inclined to shirk or free ride. In that case, the advent of a credible 
reward or penalty can work - not just by changing individuals' 
material incentives but by changing in a positive way their impression 
of the willingness of other individuals to behave cooperatively in a 
collective-action setting. 
An example is the power of higher-than-average wages to elicit 
higher-than-average productivity in the workplace.14 Workers 
naturally suspect their firms of being unwilling to share a fair portion 
of the surplus generated by the workers' labor. But when a firm offers 
workers a wage that exceeds the industry average, workers are likely 
to infer that that particular firm is willing to divide the surplus fairly; 
they therefore respond by voluntarily working more productively, 
which inclines firms to maintain or even raise their wages. The result is 
a self-sustaining form of reciprocal cooperation that obviates the need 
for costly performance-monitoring regimes. 
13. See BRUNO S. FREY, NOT JUST FOR THE MONEY: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF 
PERSONAL MOTIVATION (1997); RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP (1971) 
(finding incentives suppress donation of blood); Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation 
Crowding Theory, 15 J. ECON. SURVEYS 589 (2001); Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine 
ls a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000) (finding that fine increased rather than decreased 
abuse of day-care-center rules by parents); Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, Pay Enough or 
Don't Pay at All (Apr. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (finding that in­
centives decreased rather than increased performance of individuals soliciting charitable do­
nations). 
14. See supra note 8. 
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D. Variability of Preferences: Homogeneous vs. Heterogeneous 
Finally, the conventional theory and the reciprocity theory differ 
on the variability of preferences across individuals. The conventional 
theory imagines that the disposition to free ride in collective-action 
settings is relatively uniform. In contrast, the evidence on which the 
reciprocity theory rests suggests that the disposition to cooperate 
varies. In public-goods experiments that generate multiple equilibria, 
for example, neither universal cooperation nor universal defection is 
the final resting point. 
It makes more sense, then, to envision a distribution of cooperative 




Heterogeneity of Collective Action 
Dispositions 







Some relatively small fraction of the population (consisting, perhaps, 
of those who've been trained in neoclassical economics) consists of 
committed free riders, who shirk no matter what anyone else does, 
and another small fraction (maybe those who've read too much 
Kantian moral philosophy) consists of dedicated cooperators, who 
contribute no matter what. But most individuals are reciprocators, 
who condition their cooperation on the willingness of others to con­
tribute. Moreover, some reciprocators are relatively intolerant: they 
bolt as soon as they observe anyone else free riding. Others are rela­
tively tolerant, continuing to contribute even in the face of what they 
see as a relatively modest degree of defection. And a great many more 
- call them the neutral reciprocators - fall somewhere in between. 
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Under these circumstances, individuals are unlikely fully to over­
come collective-action problems through reciprocity dynamics alone. 
No matter how cooperative the behavior of others, the committed free 
riders will always free ride if they can get away with it. Indeed, the 
committed free riders' shirking could easily provoke noncooperative 
behavior by the less tolerant reciprocators, whose defection in turn 
risks inducing the neutral reciprocators to abandon ship, thereby 
prompting even the tolerant reciprocators to throw in the towel, and 
so forth and so on. If this unfortunate chain reaction takes place, a 
state of affairs once characterized by a reasonably high degree of 
cooperation could tip decisively toward a noncooperative equilibrium 
in which only the angelic, Kantian, unconditional cooperators are left 
contributing (probably futilely) to the relevant public good. 
Maximum cooperation, then, probably requires that reciprocity 
dynamics be supplemented with appropriately tailored incentives, 
most likely in the form of penalties aimed specifically at persistent free 
riders. Although trust and reciprocity elicit cooperation from most 
players, some coercive mechanism remains necessary for the small 
population of dedicated free riders, who continue to hold out in the 
face of widespread spontaneous cooperation, thereby depressing the 
contributions made by some relatively unforgiving reciprocators. In 
the face of a credible penalty, however, the committed free riders fall 
into line. The existence of such penalties in turn assures the less toler­
ant reciprocators that their cooperation won't make them into 
chumps; they thus continue to cooperate, less out of material interest 
than out of positive reciprocal motivations. And because the less 
tolerant reciprocators contribute, so do the neutral and tolerant recip­
rocators, generating an equilibrium of near-universal cooperation. 
Again, these dynamics are borne out by empirical evidence, particu­
larly public-goods experiments that allow subjects to retaliate against 
def ectors.15 
The uneven effect of penalties in promoting and dissipating trust 
calls attention to the expressive dimension of incentives. Incentives do 
more than affect individuals' calculations of the costs and benefits of 
particular forms of conduct; they also shape their impressions of the 
attitudes and intentions of those around them.16 Laboratory and real­
world schemes that use generally applicable incentives convey the 
message that noncooperation is the norm, and thus stifle the reciprocal 
motivations of even neutral reciprocators, whose defection predictably 
spills over onto even the most forgiving ones. Targeted retaliation, in 
contrast, conveys a very different message. Because all individuals are 
15. See Falk & Fischbacher, supra note 10; Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Cooperation 
and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 980 (2000). 
16. See generally Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 
VA. L. REV. 349 (1997). 
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aware from social experience that there are some committed free 
riders out there, no one is surprised or disappointed to see penalties 
aimed at those types; accordingly, such penalties don't create the cue­
ing, masking, or crowding-out effects associated with more generalized 
incentive regimes. On the contrary, penalties understood to be neces­
sitated only by the existence of committed free riders have a trust­
enhancing effect, for they imply that most individuals are not inclined 
to shirk. Targeted retaliation works, in sum, because it simultaneously 
coerces dedicated free riders, calms unforgiving reciprocators, and 
avoids confusing or demoralizing neutral and forgiving reciprocators. 
Ill. TAX COMPLIANCE 
Tax compliance is the consummate collective-action problem from 
a public-policy point of view. Society collects taxes to finance a variety 
of goods - from education to highways to national defense - that 
benefit its members collectively. Nevertheless, it is in the individual 
material interest of every citizen to free ride on her fellow citizens' 
contributions to these goods by withholding any contribution of her 
own. Accordingly, the conventional theory predicts that individuals, as 
wealth maximizers, will evade their taxes unless furnished with incen­
tives - in the form of threatened penalties - that make the expected 
return from evasion smaller than the expected return from compli­
ance.17 
This account of tax evasion is embarrassingly ill supported by 
empirical evidence. Econometric studies have concluded that the 
expected penalty for evasion explains little if any of the variation in 
compliance across space or over time.18 Survey measures also find only 
very modest correlation between reported compliance and individuals' 
subjective perception of the expected penalty for evasion.19 Finally, 
laboratory experiments that simulate the decision to evade suggest 
that probability and severity of detection can influence individual 
decisions to evade, but only when they are set at levels far in excess of 
those associated with actual policies.2 0 
17. See generally Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A 
Theoretical Analysis, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 323 (1972). 
18. See James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 818, 842 (1998); 
FRANK A. COWELL, CHEATING THE GOVERNMENT: THE ECONOMICS OF EVASION 74 
(1990); Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, The Criminal Deterrence Literature: Implications for 
Research on Taxpayer Compliance, in 2 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE 126, 142 (Jeffrey A. Roth 
& John T. Scholz eds., 1989). 
19. See, e.g., Harold G. Grasmick & Wilbur J. Scott, Tax Evasion and Mechanisms of 
Social Control: A Comparison with Grand and Petty Theft, 2 J.  ECON. PSYCHOL. 213, 225 & 
226 tbl.4 (1982). 
20. See James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 818, 841 
(1998). 
October 2003) The Logic of Reciprocity 81 
What explains a lot more, empirical research suggests, is a complex 
of factual beliefs and emotional dispositions. Thus, an individual's per­
ception of the extent of evasion powerfully predicts compliance 
behavior: the higher an individual believes the rate of tax cheating to 
be, the more likely he or she is to cheat too.21 So too are the prospects 
of shame (or potential stigma) and guilt. The more strongly she antici­
pates being condemned by others should she be caught, the more 
likely an individual is to refrain from evading. By the same token, the 
more regret or remorse an individual believes she'd experience for en­
gaging in evasion, the less likely she is to do so.22 
These are exactly the factors one would expect to influence tax 
compliance were individuals behaving like moral and emotional recip­
rocators. An emotional and moral reciprocator wants to understand 
herself and be understood by others as fair, but she loathes being 
taken advantage of. With tax collection as with other collective-action 
settings, the extent to which others appear to be contributing to the 
good in question determines which of these sensibilities comes into 
play. If most other individuals seem to be paying their taxes, then eva­
sion will provoke either guilt, shame, or both in the reciprocator who 
covets the respect of others and of herself. If, in contrast, most indi­
viduals appear to be evading, then complying won't make her feel 
guilty or ashamed at all; it will make her feel like a sucker. 
This interpretation of the data is confirmed by an experiment that 
tested how the 1986 Tax Reform Act affected compliance levels.2 3 One 
hypothesis, suggested by the conventional theory, was that individuals 
would become more or less willing to evade depending on whether the 
Tax Reform Act had increased or decreased their relative tax burden. 
The study found no such correlation. What did shift patterns of com­
pliance, the researchers found, were the types of interactions that 
individuals had with other taxpayers in the months leading up to the 
reform: those who encountered others who expressed a positive atti­
tude toward, and commitment to complying with, the Tax Reform Act 
displayed greater commitment to complying with it themselves, 
whereas those who encountered others who expressed negative atti-
21. See Robert B. Cialdini, Social Motivations to Comply: Norms, Values, and Principles, 
in 2 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE, supra note 18, at 200, 215; James P.F. Gordon, Individual 
Morality and Reputation Costs as Deterrents to Tax Evasion, 33 EUR. ECON. REV. 797 
(1989); Klepper & Nagin, supra note 18, at 144; Steven M. Sheffrin & Robert K. Triest, Can 
Brute Deterrence Backfire? Perceptions and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance, in WHY 
PEOPLE PAY TAXES 193 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992). 
22. See, e.g., Grasmick & Scott, supra note 19, at 226 tbl.4; Wilbur J. Scott & Harold G. 
Grasmick, Deterrence and Income Tax Cheating: Testing Interaction Hypotheses in Utilitarian 
Theories, 17 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 395, 403 tbl.1 (1981). 
23. Marco R. Steenbergen et al., Taxpayer Adaptation to the 1986 Tax Reform Act: Do 
New Tax Laws Affect the Way Taxpayers Think About Taxes?, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES, 
supra note 21, at 9. 
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tudes displayed less commitment.24 This effect, moreover, was 
explained completely by variation in the shame and guilt that the two 
groups of taxpayers anticipated for failing to pay their taxes.2 5 In other 
words, as moral and emotional reciprocators, these individuals natu­
rally felt guilt and shame for failing to contribute to the public good of 
tax payment in proportion to their perception that others were or were 
not contributing. 
The conventional theory of collective action is just as weak at 
explaining variance in tax compliance across nations as it is in 
explaining variance in compliance across individuals. Tax compliance 
rates vary dramatically across nations. Essentially none of this 
variance, however, can be explained by differences in the expected 
penalty for evasion. More important, researchers have concluded, are 
differences in public attitudes toward tax laws. In some nations 
(including the United States), individuals tend to view paying their 
taxes as an important civic obligation, and are highly motivated to pay 
for that reason. In other nations (including many in Western Europe), 
individuals regard tax obligations much more casually (akin, say, to 
traffic regulations in the United States), and display no particular 
moral aversion to evading them if they feel they can safely do so.26 
Varying national "tax cultures" of this sort are perfectly under­
standable under the reciprocity theory. Because individuals are recip­
rocators, their decisions in a collective-action setting feed on and re­
inforce each other, generating multiple high- and low-cooperation 
equilibria independent of the material payoffs associated with cooper­
ating or defecting. If individuals believe those around them are 
inclined to pay their taxes, they will (as a result of guilt, shame, pride, 
and the like) be more likely to comply, thereby strengthening the 
collective perception that individuals are generally inclined to pay. If, 
in contrast, individuals believe that those around them are inclined to 
evade, resentment will inhibit them from complying, strengthening the 
collective perception that most individuals are inclined to cheat. In 
other words, what we should expect to see under the reciprocity 
theory is exactly what we do see - namely, competing and relatively 
durable norms toward tax compliance.27 
The empirical evidence also bears out the trust theory's anxiety 
about the self-defeating effect of material incentives. Experimental 
24. See id. at 29-30. 
25. See id. 
26. See COWELL, supra note 18, at 102-03; James Alm et al., Economic and None­
conomic Factors in Tax Compliance, 48 KYKLOS 3 (1995). 
27. See Sheffrin & Triest, supra note 21, at 194-95 (suggesting interdependence of tax­
payer decisionmaking should generate multiple behavioral equilibria); see also COWELL, 
supra note 18, at 112-13 (developing a theoretical model that predicts multiple compliance 
equilibria based on interdependence of taxpayers' decisions to evade). 
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evidence suggests that when taxpayers are exposed to information 
highlighting the penalties for evasion, they respond in much the same 
way that subjects in public-goods experiments do when furnished with 
generalized material incentives to contribute - namely, by contribut­
ing less.28 Researchers have also found that highly politicized auditing 
campaigns tend to provoke a higher incidence of tax cheating rather 
than a lower one. 29 
The mechanism for these effects appears to be social cueing. When 
government engages in dramatic gestures to make individuals aware 
that the penalties for tax evasion are being increased, it also causes 
individuals to infer that more taxpayers than they thought are choos­
ing to cheat. This distrust of one's neighbors triggers a reciprocal 
motive to evade, which dominates the greater material incentive to 
comply associated with the higher-than-expected penalty.3 0 
Is there a way for tax enforcers to bolster taxpayers' trust in one 
another? One policy that seems to do so is simply to advise citizens 
that the vast majority of taxpayers are in fact complying. In a study 
sponsored by the Minnesota Department of Revenue, researchers sent 
letters to a group of individuals stating that tax compliance rates were 
in fact much higher than what public opinion polls suggested citizens 
believed them to be. Those individuals thereafter reported more 
income and claimed fewer deductions than did individuals in a control 
group. This is exactly what the phenomenon of reciprocity would 
predict: when they learn that others are in fact disposed to contribute 
their fair share, individual taxpayers, just like individuals in public­
goods experiments, cooperatively respond in kind. Likewise consistent 
with the reciprocity theory - and at odds with the conventional 
economic one - the Minnesota study found that individuals advised 
of high compliance rates paid more tax than did individuals who re­
ceived letters advising them that their returns would be subject to a 
greater rate of auditing!31 
Another policy that appears to promote trust and hence bolster 
reciprocal cooperation is the enactment of widely supported reforms. 
As the study of the 1986 Tax Reform Act demonstrates, such reforms 
promote the expression of positive views toward the law. When they 
hear others defending the law, individuals infer that others are 
inclined to comply. That conclusion in turn triggers the disposition to 
reciprocate. In effect, the enactment of popular reforms generates an 
environment of face-to-face assurance giving that builds trust, and a 
28. See Richard D. Schwartz & Sonya Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 
274, 298 (1967). 
29. See Sheffrin & Tries!, supra note 21, at 209-14. 
30. See id. 
31.  See STEPHEN COLEMAN, THE MINNESOTA INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE 
EXPERIMENT: STATE TAX RESULTS (1996). 
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resulting disposition to cooperate, in much the same way that discus­
sion does in public-goods experiments. 
The contribution that reciprocity makes to tax compliance doesn't 
imply that the IRS should disavow punishments for evasion 
altogether. That would be foolhardy because of the variability of indi­
vidual dispositions to cooperate in collective-action settings. With no 
risk of punishment, evasion would become commonplace among dedi­
cated cheaters, whose defections could in turn unleash a contagious 
form of demoralization among the vast run of reciprocity-minded tax­
payers. 
The difference between effective incentives and ineffective ones, 
experimental and other empirical data suggest, lies in the social 
meanings they express. Enforcers should therefore carefully select 
cases to nourish the perception that evaders are deviants, not normal 
citizens.32 It is already common belief that a certain number of excep­
tionally venal individuals will evade even when nearly all the rest of us 
are complying. The existence of coercive incentives understood to be 
aimed at those persons, then, doesn't dispel trust; on the contrary, it 
helps to assure the honest multitudes that they are not being exploited 
when they choose to pay their taxes. A model case, in this sense, was 
the tax-fraud prosecution of hotel magnate Leona Helmsley, who 
expressed open contempt for income taxes as something that "only the 
little people pay."33 
In addition, officials should always juxtapose trust-enhancing 
information with penalties. Auditing crackdowns and other high­
profile modes of enforcement risk backfiring, the evidence suggests, 
because they function as a cue that evasion is widespread. To counter­
act this inference, enforcers should be sure that the good news that the 
vast majority of citizens voluntarily comply always gets at least equal 
billing with the bad news that a small minority don't. They should take 
advantage of the attention that high-profile prosecutions naturally 
attract to publicize positive information akin to that shown to generate 
even higher rates of compliance in the Minnesota Tax Experiment. 
Unfortunately, public officials often do just the opposite. Com­
peting with other agencies and programs for appropriations, the IRS 
routinely exaggerates the inadequacy of its own enforcement powers 
and the resulting extent of evasion.34 Usually timed to be reported on 
the media the week before personal income taxes are due, IRS­
generated stories of the agency's own inefficacy in enforcing the law 
32. See Cialdini, supra note 21, at 215. 
33. See The Wicked Witch Who Has Poisoned the Big Apple, TIMES (London), Sept. 3, 
1989 (" 'She deserves everything she gets, she's scum,' said one of hundreds of people who 
waited outside the federal courthouse in Manhattan on Wednesday to jeer at Leona."). 
34. See, e.g. , David Cay Johnston, A Smaller l.R.S. Gives up on Billions in Back Taxes, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2001, at Al. 
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predictably generate resentment in those who routinely obey.35 "Are 
You a Chump?" a Forbes magazine cover story asked its tax-paying 
readers as the magazine reported on the supposed decimation of the 
IRS's enforcement capacity.36 
The United States enjoys a relatively high compliance rate. But 
like other high-cooperation equilibria sustained by reciprocity dy­
namics, the disposition of Americans voluntarily to pay their taxes 
surely could be "tipped." If by rattling its saber one day and pleading 
poverty the next, the IRS succeeds in inducing enough taxpayers to 
believe that cheating is indeed widespread, setting off a self­
reinforcing wave of evasion. The result could be a new, low­
cooperation equilibrium that, as the durability of Europe's disobedient 
tax culture attests,37 can be very difficult to reverse. Ironically, by em­
bracing the conventional-theory strategy of "incentives, incentives, 
and more incentives," the IRS risks making tax compliance into ex­
actly the type of intractable collective-action problem that the conven­
tional theory envisions it to be. 
IV. "NOTINMYBACKYARD" 
Various types of public facilities - including highways, airports, 
prisons, hazardous waste dumps, and the like - impose dispropor­
tionate burdens (noise, perceived physical danger, health risks) on 
persons who reside near them. Accordingly, even when they recognize 
the benefits of these facilities for society at large, individuals often 
resist the siting of these facilities within their own communities, a 
phenomenon that political scientists refer to as the "not in my back­
yard" phenomenon or "NIMBY."38 
The conventional theory of collective action sees NIMBY as 
another expression of individuals' propensity to withhold costly con­
tributions to public goods and instead to free ride on the contributions 
of others. Accordingly, the standard model proposes an incentives­
based solution: that the communities best situated to host a particular 
facility be compensated for the burden associated with it, presumably 
35. See, e.g., Tom Brazaitis, Wimpy IRS Emboldens Cheats, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, 
Ohio), Apr. 18, 2001, at llB; Amy Feldman & Joan Caplin, Should You Cheat on Your 
Taxes?, MONEY, Apr. 2001, at 108. 
36. Janet Novack, Are You a Chump?, FORBES, Mar. 5, 2001, at 122. 
37. See sources cited supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
38. See generally BARRY G. RABE, BEYOND NIMBY: HAZARDOUS WASTE SITING IN 
CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (1994); Don Munton, Introduction: The NIMBY 
Problem and Approaches to Facility Siting, in HAZARDOUS WASTE SITING AND 
DEMOCRATIC CHOICE 1 (Don Munton ed., 1996). 
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out of the proceeds of a tax imposed on individuals who benefit from 
the facility but who reside elsewhere.39 
This incentives-based strategy, however, has an unimpressive track 
record. Twenty years after M assachusetts enacted a widely lauded 
compensation scheme, not a single community had accepted - or 
been forced to accept - a facility siting. 40 The results have been the 
same in numerous other states and Canadian provinces that have tried 
to induce siting with compensation. 41 
Indeed, there is evidence that compensation schemes sometimes 
make the NIMBY problem worse. According to some studies, resi­
dents often bridle at "compensation offers . . .  as attempts to buy them 
off or bribe them." 42 The potential of incentives to backfire in this way 
has been confirmed experimentally by Swiss economists Bruno Frey 
and Felix Oberholzer-Gee, who showed that a compensation offer 
dramatically reduced (from just over 50% to less than 25%) the num­
ber of laboratory subjects willing to assent to the siting of a nuclear­
waste storage facility in their community. 43 
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that compensation 
schemes never work. At least some opinion studies have shown that 
offers of compensation can significantly increase willingness to accept 
the siting of a noxious facility.44 Moreover, compensation in one form 
39. The classic statement of this analysis is Michael O'Hare, "Not on My Block You 
Don't": Facility Siting and the Strategic Importance of Compensation, 25 PUB. POL'Y 407 
(1977). 
40. See KENT E. PORTNEY, SITING HAZARDOUS WASTE TREATMENT FACILITIES 28 
(1991); RABE, supra note 38, at 36-37; Rutherford H. Platt & Peter B. Klejna, Recent Devel­
opments in Massachusetts Groundwater Law, Water Resources Update (Univs. Council on 
Water Res., Carbondale, Ill.), Spring 1991, at 22, 23, available at http:/1131.230.120.111/ 
udates/pdf/V85_A5.pdf. 
41. See RABE, supra note 38, at 39-44. 
42. Munton, supra note 38, at 17. 
43. See FREY, supra note 13, at 69-75. In the experiment, investigators measured the 
willingness of subjects to accept the siting of a nuclear-waste storage facility in their commu­
nity, first without compensation and then with it. They found that individual willingness to 
accept the site was initially relatively high overall (just over 50% ). When subjects were told 
that the community in which the site was to be located would receive monetary compensa­
tion, however, overall willingness to accept the site dropped dramatically (to less than 25%). 
By measuring the respondents' perceptions of the dangers of nuclear-waste storage before 
and after the experiment, moreover, Frey and Oberholzer-Gee were able to exclude the ex­
planation that the compensation offer had induced respondents to revise upward their as­
sessment of the risk associated with the facility. Rather, the compensation offer had created 
resistance, the experimenters concluded, by changing the moral significance of accepting the 
siting. See id. at 69-75. 
44. See Howard Kunreuther & Doug Easterling, The Role of Compensation in Siting 
Hazardous Facilities, 15 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 601, 605-06 (1996); Howard 
Kunreuther et al., Public Attitudes Toward Siting a High-Level Nuclear Waste Repository in 
Nevada, 10 RISK ANALYSIS 469, 480 (1990). 
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or another has nearly always been a part of successful waste-facility­
siting efforts in the United States and Canada in recent decades.45 
Although failures predominate, it's fair to conclude that "studies 
show a high degree of variability in the ability of compensation to 
change public opinion" toward siting.46 But precisely because they are 
not uniformly positive, these results furnish little support for the con­
ventional theory's account of NIMBY. Clearly, something more than 
the weighing of material costs and benefits is going on when communi­
ties decide whether to resist or to accept noxious facilities. 
That something more, opinion analyses suggest, is the moral and 
emotional reaction of residents to siting proposals. Individuals who 
interpret the decision to impose a site on their community as signifying 
the low social status of its residents - who believe they are being 
"dumped on," symbolically as well as literally - are more likely to 
resist.47 Those who distrust government institutions are also less likely 
to tolerate the siting of a noxious facility in their vicinity,48 as are those 
who believe that societal benefits and burdens in general, and the 
burdens associated with the facility in question in particular, are being 
distributed inequitably.49 The perception that the community's racial 
composition is playing a role in that process can create intense opposi­
tion in minority communities, which historically have been least able 
to muster the political resources necessary to resist forced sitings.5 0 
These are the sorts of factors one would expect to influence the 
reactions of individuals who behave like moral and emotional recipro­
cators with respect to civic obligations. When called upon to accept 
risks or inconveniences in the interest of the public good, individuals 
who believe that societal benefits and burdens are being inequitably 
distributed by fundamentally unjust political institutions unsurpris­
ingly answer, "No." 
Reciprocal motivations also explain another factor relevant to 
acceptance of toxic waste facilities: the origin of the wastes. A wealth­
maximization model suggests that waste source should be irrelevant: 
home-grown wastes are every bit as hazardous as out-of-town ones. 
45. See Munton, supra note 38, at 16; Douglas J. Lober, Beyond NIMBY: Public Atti­
tudes and Behavior and Waste Facility Siting Policy 124-25 (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dis­
sertation, Yale Univ., School of Forestry & Env't Stud.) (on file with author). 
46. Kunreuther & Easterling, supra note 44, at 605. 
47. Lober, supra note 45, at 120; see also Kunreuther et al., supra note 44, at 470; Paul 
Slovic et al., Perceived Risk, Stigma, and Potential Economic Impacts of High-Level Nuclear 
Waste Repository in Nevada, in RISK, MEDIA, AND STIGMA 87 (James Flynn et al. eds., 
2001). 
48. See Robin Gregory et al., Incentive Policies to Site Hazardous Waste Facilities, 11 
RISK ANALYSIS 667, 672 (1991); Kunreuther et al., supra note 44, at 472; Lober, supra note 
45, at 140-42. 
49. See Kunreuther & Easterling, supra note 44, at 601-02; Lober, supra note 45, at 145. 
50. See RABE, supra note 38, at 21; Lober, supra note 45, at 145. 
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But in fact, individuals are much more likely to accept disposal facili­
ties for wastes produced locally.51 This makes sense insofar as indi­
viduals are likely to accept a waste-disposal facility in a spirit of 
positive reciprocation when they understand the waste to have been 
generated by beneficial local activities. 
The uneven effect of compensation schemes also conforms to the 
logic of reciprocity, which implies that the effect of incentives in dissi­
pating or promoting trust depends critically on citizens' moral and 
emotional priors. Imagine a society whose citizens begin with the 
belief that societal burdens are being equitably distributed through a 
just political process. We might expect those individuals, as reciproca­
tors, to be relatively accepting of the siting of noxious facilities in their 
community. But if authorities try to purchase acceptance with incen­
tives, these same individuals might revise their views, inferring that 
other communities must in fact be unwilling to accept such impositions 
voluntarily. As a result of this perverse cueing effect, the NIMBY 
phenomenon will grow in strength when incentives are offered, as 
individuals reciprocate the perceived resistance to such facilities by 
strengthening their own resistance to them. 
This reaction plausibly explains the results in the Frey/Oberholzer­
Gee experiment.52 Homogeneous, democratic, and small, Switzerland 
has an admirable history of resolving disputes over the allocation of 
societal benefits and burdens through a fair process of deliberative 
give-and-take. The Swiss subjects in the experiment therefore inter­
preted the offer of a cash payment as evidence that the norm of 
mutual accommodation had broken down in the case of nuclear wastes 
and became predictably indignant at attempts to buy their assent to a 
risk that others refused to endure. 
But now imagine the perhaps more typical U.S. or Canadian case 
of a community whose residents start off with the belief that society's 
resources are being inequitably distributed as a result of a fundamen­
tally unjust political system. As reciprocators, they are likely to resist 
the nearby siting of a noxious facility. Yet in that climate, there is at 
least some potential for compensation to work: not only does compen­
sation help to offset the material inconveniences or risks associated 
with the facility; the very offering of it conveys a degree of respect that 
previously had been lacking in the community's political life. 
Case studies suggest that this result is most likely when incentives 
are part of a negotiated, bottom-up siting regime rather than a 
centrally administered top-down one.53 Even with compensation, the 
51. See RABE, supra note 38, at 44; Lober, supra note 45, at 126. 
52. See supra note 43. 
53. See RABE, supra note 38, at 59; Kunreuther & Easterling, supra note 44, at 618; 
Munion, supra note 38, at 19-20. 
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imposition of a site by a centralized bureaucracy is likely to provoke 
negative reciprocal motivations. The authority of administrators to 
dictate the site location suggests that others are unwilling to accept the 
facility voluntarily, a signal that is reinforced by the offer of compen­
sation. When voluntary acceptance is solicited, however, communities 
that historically have been disadvantaged are likely to feel respected 
and empowered; the offer of compensation no longer insults them but 
instead reinforces the signal that authorities genuinely respect the sov­
ereignty of the host community. In addition, the process of negotiation 
is likely to create a climate akin to the face-to-face discussions in 
public-goods games: when local communities are able to discuss the 
situation with remote political authorities, and are granted veto power, 
local communities are likely to be assured that others are willing to 
contribute their fair share to dealing with the problem. Accordingly, 
they reciprocate positively by being more receptive to placement of 
the facility. 
These effects, case studies suggest, feed on each other, generating 
multiple behavioral equilibria. Again, in Massachusetts, which enacted 
a top-down, dictate-plus-compensation regime in the 1980s, one com­
munity after another fought off attempts to site hazardous waste facili­
ties within its borders. In contrast, in Wisconsin, which has a bottom­
up, negotiated-compensation scheme, a succession of communities 
have come forward to accept such facilities.5 4 Provinces in western 
Canada have had similar strings of successes with the negotiated­
compensation strategy.55 
The key to solving NIMBY, in short, is trust. Various sources of 
evidence suggest that individuals can be made receptive to the siting of 
noxious facilities in their communities if they can be made to believe 
that society is committed to treating their interests with respect. 
Appropriately structured bottom-up, negotiated-compensation 
schemes - ones framed to emphasize respect for the interests and 
autonomy of prospective host communities - are one way to reverse 
deep-seated resentments and thus excite a reciprocal openness 
to siting decisions. If individuals cannot be made to believe that the 
burden of accepting a noxious facility is being fairly reciprocated 
either in kind or by like sacrifices, the current of resentment that fuels 
NIMBY will be difficult to reverse, even with financial incentives. 
54. See Kunreuther & Easterling, supra note 44, at 618; Lober, supra note 45, at 222-23. 
55. See RABE, supra note 38, at 61-81; Geoffrey Castle & Don Munton, Voluntary Siting 
of Hazardous Waste Facilities in Western Canada, in HAZARDOUS WASTE SITING AND 
DEMOCRATIC CHOICE, supra note 38, at 57. 
90 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 102:71 
V. IDEAS AND TECHNOLOGY 
Ideas are a classic collective good. We all benefit from useful 
inventions, engaging works of literature, effective medicines for 
disease, and the like. But why should any one of us endure the cost 
associated with producing them when we can freely avail ourselves of 
the inventive labors of others? The conventional theory again resorts 
to incentives, in the form of intellectual-property rights, that are 
deemed to motivate invention by permitting inventors to condition use 
of their ideas on payment of a fee.56 
But the logic of reciprocity suggests an alternative solution. If indi­
viduals behave in this collective-action setting as they do in others -
that is, as moral and emotional reciprocators - then they will contrib­
ute to the common pool of ideas not only when they expect material 
reward, but also when they observe other individuals contributing to it 
and when they anticipate that sharing the fruits of their own creativity 
will induce others to do the same. 
The possibility of a reciprocal alternative to proprietary production 
is not merely a matter of theoretical conjecture. The prime example of 
such a regime is the university. Academics freely exchange ideas by 
teaching, attending conferences, and most importantly by publishing 
books and articles. This exchange, moreover, is deeply reciprocal. Self­
consciously building on the published works of their predecessors, and 
publishing works that will be extended by their successors, physicists 
delineate the laws of nature, mathematicians solve intricate formal 
problems, philosophers construct theories of justice, and so forth and 
so on.57 
Reciprocal exchange is in fact integral to the structure of scholarly 
production. In Thomas Kuhn's well-known account,58 activity within 
scholarly disciplines59 is cyclical: fairly stable periods of "normal 
science,'' in which scholars conform their work to a widely shared set 
of assumptions or "dominant paradigm," are punctuated by "scientific 
revolutions," in which the dominant paradigm is overthrown and 
56. See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources 
for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL FACTORS 609 (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962). 
57. See generally WARREN 0. HAGSTROM, THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY (1965); 
ROBERT K. MERTON, The Normative Structure of Science, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 
(1973). 
58. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 
1970). 
59. Although Kuhn developed his account as an explanation of how knowledge devel­
ops in the natural sciences, his model has since been applied to other disciplines, including 
the social sciences and the humanities. See generally BARRY BARNES, T.S. KUHN AND 
SOCIAL SCIENCE (1982); STANLEY FISH, Rhetoric, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 
471, 486 (1989); Steven M. Wise, Hardly a Revolution: The Eligibility of Nonhuman Animals 
for Dignity-Rights in a Liberal Democracy, 22 VT. L. REV. 793, 826 n.171 (1998). 
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replaced by a new one - which underwrites the next period of normal 
science. As scholars contribute incrementally to a body of work gener­
ated by like contributions from others, reciprocal exchange is the rule 
during periods of normal science. But it is no less significant a force 
during periods of scientific revolution. Because new paradigms are 
inevitably forged in opposition to old ones, scientific revolutionaries 
are ironically indebted to the work amassed by normal-science appa­
ratchiks; and as they launch their assault, the revolutionaries predicta­
bly benefit defenders of disciplinary orthodoxy, who are enlivened by 
the sudden opportunity to say something new and pertinent in defense 
of their work.60 
The reciprocal nature of scholarly production helps to reconcile 
competing stereotypes of the academic enterprise. One view sees it as 
highly collaborative. Sociologists of science, for example, assert that 
the production of knowledge in the university is guided by a norm of 
"communism" or sharing of ideas.6 1 Another view, though, sees the 
academic enterprise as highly competitive: scholars strive to demon­
strate that their ideas are better than everyone else's.6 2 The truth is 
that scholarly production is simultaneously collaborative and competi­
tive. Scholars do compete, fiercely, for the recognition and status that 
is accorded to those who make academic discoveries that either extend 
understanding within the dominant paradigm or overthrow that para­
digm altogether.63 In the regime of intellectual production characteris­
tic of the university, competition and collaboration are yoked in a 
harness of reciprocal exchange. 
The nexus between status and reciprocal exchange helps to explain 
how nonfinancial rewards operate to generate intellectual production 
within the university. Obviously, many individuals are drawn to the 
university because they get immense personal satisfaction simply from 
participating in shared intellectual endeavors. But many of those types 
also covet the special extrinsic rewards conferred upon those who 
excel in academic fields - namely, recognition and status, both within 
the university and within a larger society that esteems intellectual 
accomplishment. The desire for these goods impels individuals to 
behave like reciprocal producers insofar as the ideas most likely to 
gain widespread admiration are ones that draw on and enable the 
work of other scholars.64 
60. See KUHN, supra note 58. 
61. See, e.g., MERTON, supra note 57, at 273 -75. 
62. See ROBERT K. MERTON, Priorities in Scientific Discovery, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
SCIENCE, supra note 57, at 286 -324. 
63. See id. at 293-94. 
64. See ALFONSO GAMBARDELLA, SCIENCE AND INNOVATION: THE us 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY DURING THE 1980s 8-9 (1995); Partha Dasgupta & Paul A. 
David, Information Disclosure and the Economics of Science and Technology, in ARROW 
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Indeed, the desire for recognition and status makes monetary 
reward secondary, if not completely irrelevant, in the development of 
ideas. It's true that university professors get paid to produce. But 
what's significant is how little they get paid relative to what they could 
have made outside the university. Natural scientists, economists, and 
- of course - law professors forgo commercial employment oppor­
tunities in which they could make salaries many times larger than the 
ones they earn from teaching and publishing. Even scholars whose 
specialties don't involve highly marketable skills (say, professors of 
eighteenth-century English literature) typically could have chosen 
educational paths known to lead to more remunerative destinations 
(e.g., Madison A venue advertising firms). The difference between 
what these scholars make and what they could make, or could have 
made, in private-sector positions reflects at least in part how much 
they value the unique, nonmaterial rewards associated with partici­
pating in a system of reciprocal intellectual production. 
Sociologists of science sometimes sharply distinguish between the 
scientific or university mode of intellectual production and a commer­
cial or proprietary one. The former is driven by the intrinsic and repu­
tational rewards associated with collaborative intellectual production, 
which presuppose norms of publicity and sharing. The latter is said to 
be driven by profit, and thus to depend on norms of secrecy that 
enable producers to extract fees for access to their ideas.65 
The contrast, however, turns out to be overstated. The commercial 
mode of production often incorporates the university mode. In the 
telecommunications, pharmaceutical, and computer industries, firms 
frequently organize their research-and-development teams on a 
university model, encouraging employees not only to share their work 
with one another but also to attend academic conferences, publish 
scholarly papers, and otherwise exchange ideas with outsider academic 
and commercial researchers.66 The most famous example is AT&T's 
Bell Labs, which for decades offered positions that were as highly 
coveted as professorships at elite universities and which published a 
respected peer-reviewed research journal.67 
Economists have regarded the emulation of the university model 
by private firms as a puzzle, particularly insofar as the disclosure of 
AND THE ASCENT OF MODERN ECONOMIC THEORY 519, 528-31, 534 (G.R. Feiwel ed., 1987) 
(hereinafter Dasgupta & David, Information Disclosure and the Economics of Science and 
Technology]. 
65. See HAGSTROM, supra note 57; MERTON, supra note 57. 
66. See GAMBARDELLA, supra note 64, at 17, 82-83, 86, 103; Partha Dasgupta & Paul A. 
David, Toward a New Economics of Science, 23 RES. POL'Y 487, 495 (1994) [hereinafter 
Dasgupta & David, Toward a New Economics of Science]. 
67. See generally JEREMY BERNSTEIN, THREE DEGREES ABOVE ZERO: BELL LABS IN 
THE INFORMATION AGE (1984); NARAIN GEHANI, BELL LABS: LIFE IN THE CROWN JEWEL 
(2003). 
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ideas is thought to vitiate the competitive advantage afforded by firms' 
research investments.68 
The phenomenon of reciprocal creativity suggests a possible 
explanation. Suppose researchers who desire to participate in collabo­
rative invention and to gain recognition for intellectual accomplish­
ment are on average more creative and productive than those moti­
vated only by financial inducements. If so, the former will be 
particularly in demand within industry. But to attract these individu­
als, firms will necessarily have to offer them an opportunity to satisfy 
their distinctive preference to participate in the open, reciprocal mode 
of production characteristic of the university, particularly if the firms 
are competing with universities to hire them.69 Firms can be expected 
to offer this nonmonetary species of compensation so long as the 
losses they endure as a result of permitting bright researchers to 
disseminate their ideas are offset by the gains the firm reaps from 
having such persons on their research teams. 
This account turns out to be well supported in fact. Firms in infor­
mation-intensive industries in fact say that they tolerate (and indeed 
encourage) their researchers openly disseminating their ideas, par­
ticularly to university scholars, in order to attract the most talented 
researchers.7 0  And empirical evidence confirms a direct correlation be­
tween the productivity of firms in the pharmaceutical industries 
and the frequency with which their researchers publish in academic 
journals.71 
The final and most significant example of the reciprocal mode 
of intellectual production is the advent of "open-source" software 
projects. Where a programmer employs an open-source license, she 
authorizes anyone to use her software product free of charge so long 
as the user agrees not to disguise the identity of the programmers who 
have contributed to the product's development, and to distribute for 
free any additions or modifications the user makes to the program 
herself.7 2  The conventional theory of collective action predicts that 
68. Douglas Lichtman et al., Strategic Disclosure in the Patent System, 53 V AND. L. REV. 
2175 (2000) (describing phenomenon and suggesting signaling solution); Gideon Parcho­
movsky, Publish or Perish, 98 MICH. L. REV. 926 (2000) (suggesting patent-preemption 
motivation). 
69. See GAMBARDELLA, supra note 64, at 46-47; JOSH LERNER & JEAN TIROLE, THE 
SIMPLE ECONOMICS OF OPEN SOURCE 24 (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 7600, 2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7600. 
70. See, e.g., GEHANI, supra note 67, at 16-20, 45, 58-59, 70-72. 
71. See GAMBARDELLA, supra note 64, at 82-83, 86; Rebecca Henderson & Iain Cock­
burn, Measuring Competence? Exploring Firm Effects in Pharmaceutical Research, 15 
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 63 (1994). These studies, of course, control for other influences on 
productivity, including firm size. 
72. See generally GLYN MOODY, REBEL CODE: LINUX AND THE OPEN SOURCE 
REVOLUTION (2001). The Open Source Initiative, a nonprofit corporation that coordinates 
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open-source products will be few in number and low in quality, since 
neither the individual who creates such a program nor anyone who 
thereafter improves it can recover any commercial benefit for her 
efforts. But in fact, the open-source license has spawned an immense 
collection of extremely popular and dynamic products. Linux, the 
premier open-source operating system, for example, is widely 
regarded as superior to commercially produced operating systems. 
Apache is the most popular web server, enjoying a dominant share in 
a market in which it competes with the products of numerous com­
mercial firms including Microsoft.73 
Open-source programming is fueled by the same individual moti­
vations that generate reciprocal intellectual production within both 
the university and commercial firms that emulate the university 
model. Like other collaborative producers, open-source programmers 
- typically students and commercial programmers working in their 
spare time - enjoy participating in the collaborative process for its 
own sake. In addition, many of the most productive open-source 
programmers covet the status accorded to those who are recognized as 
having made the most valuable modifications to popular open-source 
products.7 4 Producing and distributing valued program enhancements 
(the authorship of which cannot be obscured under the typical open­
source license) is thus a condition of enjoying these ends. In addition, 
even program users who do not attach particular value to participating 
and gaining status within this form of collaborative intellectual 
production are often motivated by the reciprocal motive of gratitude 
to share with other contributors any enhancements they make to an 
open-source product.75 
More significant than what open-source programming confirms 
about the motivation of individuals to participate in schemes of recip­
rocal intellectual production is what it implies about the increasing 
economic feasibility of such activity. Historically, individuals who 
might otherwise have freely lent their efforts to reciprocal modes of 
production would have had to pay a dauntingly high price - not just 
in terms of the costs associated with production itself, but also in terms 
open-source standards and collects information on open-source products and developments, 
defines the terms of such licenses at http://www.opensource.org/docs/definition.php. 
73. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FuTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD 54-57 (2001); MOODY, supra note 72. 
74. The immense fame enjoyed by Linus Torvalds, who designed the "kernel" of the 
Linux operating system, the name of which reflects his own, is a conspicuous case in point. 
Jim Kerstetter, The Linux Uprising, Bus. WK., Mar. 3, 2002, at 78. 
75. See Peter Kollock, The Economies of Online Cooperation: Gifts and Public Goods in 
Cyberspace, in COMMUNITIES IN CYBERSPACE 220, 227-29 (Marc A. Smith & Peter Kollock 
eds., 1999); KARIM LAKHANI & ERIC VON HIPPEL, How OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE 
WORKS: "FREE" USER-TO-USER ASSISTANCE 31 (MIT Sloan Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper 
No. 4117, May 2000). 
October 2003] The Logic of Reciprocity 95 
of the costs associated with simply locating other producers willing to 
reciprocate their efforts and distributing information to them. But 
with the ubiquity of the personal computer and the comprehensive 
networking furnished by the internet, these constraints are disappear­
ing, making it possible for increasingly large numbers of individuals 
to participate in collaborative production.76 In addition, the more 
individuals who find it possible to participate, the more who find it 
valuable to participate: the benefits from participating and gaining 
status in collaborative production are a function of the number of 
individuals with whom a creator can collaborate, and from whom she 
can earn esteem.77 Like other forms of behavior governed by the logic 
of reciprocity, spontaneous intellectual production feeds on itself.78 
The reality of the reciprocal production of ideas has important 
policy implications. Because intellectual laborers can't live on recipro­
cal utility alone, regimes of reciprocal production are unlikely to be 
completely self-sufficient. University scholars draw a salary, however 
modest; researchers at Bell Labs and other industrial campuses get 
compensated not just with opportunities to publicize their inventions 
but also with cash; open-source programmers, too, tend either to be 
employed or, if they are students, to be seeking employment either by 
universities or by firms in the computer industry. But because creative 
individuals get at least some utility from participating in reciprocal 
intellectual production for its own sake, there is less need to rely on 
intellectual property rights to spur creativity than the conventional 
theory implies. And less is better, since intellectual-property regimes, 
like other forms of material incentives - particularly those that confer 
monopoly power on producers - generate deadweight losses.79 
Consider the benefit that firms in high-tech industries gain from 
interactions between their researchers and university scientists. To 
promote such contacts, some commentators favor construing patent 
76. See Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 1 12 
YALE L.J. 369, 404-05 (2002). 
77. See LERNER & TIROLE, supra note 69, at 15-16. 
78. Open-source licensing does not prohibit commercial marketing of products that con­
tain open-source code. A Linux package, for example, is successfully distributed by the firm 
Red Hat. See MOODY, supra note 72, at 96-98. The existence of commercial distributors, 
which combine the product with relatively user-friendly installation programs as well as sup­
port services, does not detract from the point that the individuals who are in fact creating the 
product that is being so distributed do so without being commercially compensated for their 
efforts. Indeed, the tendency of open-source products to generate ancillary commercial 
opportunities furnishes commercial firms with incentives to subsidize open-source develop­
ment - as, for example, Compaq Computer Corp. and IBM both have for Linux, see id. at 
222-36 - thereby reinforcing the economic feasibility of this nonproprietary mode of intel­
lectual production. 
79. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable 
Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 476-77 (2003); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in 
Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1 197, 1205-09 (1996). 
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law broadly to protect academic works published by these firms' 
researchers.8 0 This suggestion, however, ignores how reciprocity influ­
ences the economics of commercial intellectual production. Because 
the most talented researchers demand the opportunity to disseminate 
their work to academics as a form of compensation, competitive pres­
sures often drive firms in the pharmaceutical, computer, and telecom­
munications industries to permit such exchange even at the expense of 
those firms' proprietary control over their researchers' work. Conse­
quently, there's no need subsidize this form of idea production with 
intellectual-property protections. 
Indeed, more property rights than are necessary to support recip­
rocal production is likely to be self-defeating, the logic of reciprocity 
suggests, insofar as material incentives can impede reciprocal motiva­
tions. In a reciprocal system of production, creators naturally produce 
and share ideas that other creators are likely to find useful in order to 
obtain recognition and respect. In a proprietary system, however, 
creators gain a competitive advantage by concealing their ideas from 
one another and releasing their work only at a point, and in a form, in 
which they can charge a fee for it. This refusal to collaborate can be 
expected to generate resentment among reciprocally motivated pro­
ducers, who will in turn grow less willing to share their own ideas. 
Indeed, when they see others conspicuously cashing in on inventions 
enabled by their work, those who do publicize their ideas for free are 
more likely to feel exploited than honored by their peers. By reversing 
the emotional payoff associated with spontaneously adding one's ideas 
to the common stock, material incentives effectively crowd out 
nonmaterial reciprocal ones.8 1 
The negative impact of property rights on reciprocal production is 
likely to be self-reinforcing. Some individuals who are only weakly 
motivated by reciprocity will find the advent of material reward a 
reason to join the system of proprietary production instead. As the 
number of individuals engaged in reciprocal production dwindles, the 
participatory and reputational benefits associated with collaborative 
production will naturally decline too, stifling interest among creators 
whose reciprocal inclinations are more moderate in strength. Finally, 
as more and more individuals opt out, even the individuals most 
strongly devoted to a collaborative system of production will find the 
occasions for reciprocating the free exchange of ideas increasingly 
scarce - and the occasions for spitefully reciprocating covetous 
behavior by proprietary producers increasingly common. The advent 
of unnecessary incentives, then, can tip a reciprocal system of produc­
tion from a highly cooperative equilibrium into a highly noncoopera-
80. See, e.g., GAMBARDELLA, supra note 64, at 48. 
81. See Benkler, supra note 76, at 439-41 .  
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tive one, in which expansive - and socially costly - property rights 
are all the more necessary .82 
This is, in fact exactly what some commentators believe has hap­
pened in the natural sciences. In 1980, Congress enacted the Bayh­
Dole Act, which enlarged the eligibility of universities to obtain pat­
ents on so-called "basic research." Intended to promote collaboration 
between university scientists and commercial biotechnology firms, the 
Act instead undermined norms of reciprocal collaboration among uni­
versity scientists themselves. In response to the Act, a number of 
major universities instituted "intellectual property transfer" depart­
ments to encourage faculty to conduct their research in a manner con­
sistent with their institutions' interest in licensing patents to commer­
cial firms. As a result, scientists at other institutions began to find 
themselves denied access to many of the most essential materials and 
processes in their fields - including gene sequences, cell lines, assays, 
and genetically engineered experimental mice - which were either 
patented or held close by scientists anxious not to forfeit their com­
petitive advantage in patent races. Indeed, for many scientists, the suc­
cessful filing of patent applications overtook the publication of articles 
as a measure of professional success. Many other scientists resented 
the erosion of the traditional university norms of openness and pub­
licity. But eventually even they grew wary of casually placing into the 
public domain discoveries that nonreciprocating "colleagues" were 
likely to appropriate for commercial gain.83 
Reciprocal production on the internet is even more vulnerable to 
excessive property rights. The internet makes it dirt cheap for recipro­
cal producers to access information - the raw material that fuels their 
creative efforts - and to disseminate their works among themselves. 
The internet's effect on information-access costs, however, is being 
reversed by liberal interpretations of existing intellectual-property 
rights and by the legislative creation of new ones, which stifle internet 
distribution of software codes, databases, and conventional literary 
works. Its effect on dissemination costs is being threatened by the 
attempted proprietization of standardized protocols for the software 
essential to accessing and using the internet.8 4 By raising the cost of 
82. See Dasgupta & David, Information Disclosure and the Economics of Science and 
Technology, supra note 64, at 535-37; Dasgupta & David, Toward a New Economics of Sci­
ence, supra note 66, at 513-15. 
83. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998); Robert P. Merges, Property 
Rights Theory and the Commons: The Case of Scientific Research, in SCIENTIFIC 
INNOVATION, PHILOSOPHY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 145 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1996); 
Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of 
Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77 (1999). 
84. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Or­
ganizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889 (2002); Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of 
98 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 102:71 
obtaining and distributing information, these developments risk pric­
ing out many casual open-source programmers.8 5 And as the number 
of open-source creators declines, additional ones will find it harder 
and less satisfying to participate in this form of reciprocal production 
as well. 
The logic of reciprocity implies, here as elsewhere, that it makes 
more sense to nourish trust than to alter material payoffs. Policymak­
ers can do this, in part, by simply clearing the path for established and 
emerging systems of collaborative intellectual production. Where, as 
in the university and in many information-intensive industries, reci­
procity dynamics are already spurring invention, policymakers should 
steer clear of the potentially toxic imposition of property rights. By 
appropriately narrow interpretations of existing intellectual-property 
provisions, policymakers can also head off the demoralizing prospect 
of materially motivated actors exploiting the fruit of reciprocal pro­
duction for commercial gain. 
Ultimately, though, the government will likely need to take a more 
active stance in promoting reciprocity. As the examples of the univer­
sity, the industrial campus, and open-source programming all illus­
trate, collaborative intellectual production depends on ancillary sys­
tems of material compensation for reciprocal producers. Private actors 
- including philanthropists in the case of universities, and commer­
cially motivated firms in the case of industrial campuses - will be 
motivated to contribute part of what it costs to operate such systems, 
but they are unlikely to contribute the optimal amount. Indeed, gov­
ernment subsidization has traditionally played a vital role in securing 
the societal benefits of reciprocal production in the university. Similar 
efforts of public support - perhaps in the form of tax benefits for 
firms that invest in open-source technologies - are likely to be neces­
sary to realize the full potential of the internet as a catalyst of recipro­
cal production. 
Nonproprietary collaborative production has historically played a 
major role in the creation of ideas. Guided by the logic of reciprocity, 
it has the potential to play an even larger one as in the future. 
VI. OTHER APPLICATIONS 
The reciprocity theory has implications for a broad range of policy 
problems in addition to tax collection, the siting of noxious facilities, 
End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. 
REV. 925 (2001). 
85. See Y ochai Benkler, Intellectual Property and the Organization of Information Pro­
duction, 22 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 81 (2002); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Move­
ment and the Construction of the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 
2003, at 33. 
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and the production of ideas. It's possible to sketch several in broad 
outline. 
A. Fraud and Corruption 
Like individuals' disposition to engage in tax evasion, individuals' 
disposition to engage in fraud or corruption appears to depend on 
whether they think other individuals are engaged in such behavior.s6 
This implies that high-profile campaigns to crack down on such 
behavior, like high-profile crackdowns on tax evasion, can backfire.s7 
Indeed, when government invests more to deter fraud, individuals 
have less incentive to invest in credibly signaling to others that they 
are trustworthy and honest, and hence reliable as trade partners. 
Because individuals reciprocate honesty with honesty, the suppression 
of individuals' efforts to display honesty to others will predictably 
reduce the disposition of individuals to behave honestly, thus making 
penalties for dishonesty less effective. A better policy, again, is to 
make citizens aware that those around them are basically honest. 
Or at least that is the best policy where individuals are in fact 
generally honest. In a condition of pervasive distrust - such as that 
which obtains in many former Eastern bloc nations - strong penalties 
for fraud and dishonesty may be the only thing that works. Moreover, 
in such a climate, penalties for dishonesty may in fact promote rather 
than undermine trust. Individuals who resent fraud and corruption are 
likely to interpret the advent of credible penalties as evidence that 
others around them now feel the same way and are prepared to do 
something about it. Some of those individuals will be moved to recip­
rocate by behaving more honestly themselves, inducing still others to 
do the same, and so forth and so on, until a new condition of self­
reinforcing cooperation is reached - at which point maintenance of 
high penalties may be less necessary.ss 
B. Democracy 
The application of the conventional model of collective action to 
democratic politics yields public choice theory. According to that 
theory, citizens, because they are self-interested wealth maximizers, 
will forgo public-spirited deliberation and instead organize themselves 
86. See JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 268-70 
(1989); Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More Order Without More Law: A Theory of Social 
Norms and Organizational Cultures, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 390 (1994). 
87. ELSTER, supra note 86, at 270. 
88. See generally SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: 
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM (1999). 
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into interest groups for the purpose of extracting rents.89 To combat 
this dynamic, policy analysts have proposed a wide variety of struc­
tural devices - from campaign-finance laws9 0 to term limits91 to line­
item vetoes9 2 to budget-process reforms93 - all of which seek to raise 
the cost or reduce the benefits of organizing into special-interest pres­
sure groups. 
The reciprocity theory suggests a different analysis. As a positive 
matter, it points to a substantial body of empirical research suggesting 
that the behavior of elected representatives is limited by informal 
norms that discourage unconstrained efforts to redirect public re­
sources toward one's own constituencies.94 Thus, reciprocity dynamics 
make at least some contribution to containing special-interest politics. 
As a prescriptive matter, the reciprocity model warns us not to 
assume that structural reforms will invariably reinforce reciprocity 
norms in this setting. Policies designed to counteract public choice 
pressures do more than change political actors' incentives to engage in 
rent-seeking; they also broadcast to citizens and their representatives 
that we expect political actors to engage in rent-seeking behavior 
whenever it is in their interest to do so. Because individuals are recip­
rocators, they are likely to respond to this message by displaying even 
less restraint in the pursuit of their material interests in democratic 
political life. Thus, reforms aimed at reducing incentives to behave in a 
self-interested fashion might well dissipate reciprocity-based norms 
that now hold such behavior at least partially in check, and thereby in­
crease special-interest rent-seeking on net. The reciprocity model thus 
underscores the anxiety that too readily accepting the public choice 
picture can make it the reality of our political life.95 
At the same time, however, the reciprocity theory underscores 
how reforms that reflect different assumptions might stimulate public 
spiritedness. For example, scholars have proposed that the state award 
89. OLSON, supra note 1, is again the foundational work. See also JAMES M. BUCHANAN 
& GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962). 
90. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor Ano­
nymity to Disrupt the Market for Political Influence, 50 STAN. L. REV. 837 (1998). 
91. See generally Elizabeth Garrett, Term Limitations and the Myth of the Citizen­
Legislator, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 623 (1996) (critiquing use of term limits to counteract pub­
lic choice dynamics). 
92. See Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Restraint: The Federal Budget Process and 
the Line Item Veto Act, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 871 (1999). 
93. See Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in the Federal 
Budget Process, 35 HARV. J. ON LEG. 387 (1998). 
94. See generally DONALD P. GREEN & !AN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL 
CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (1994). 
95. See JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC 
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997). 
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citizens two types of monetary grants: "stakes" that they can use as 
they see fit upon adulthood, and "patriot dollars" that they can con­
tribute to the political campaigns of their choice.96 The first expresses 
society's commitment to assuring individuals a fair chance to realize 
their life plans, the second its commitment to assuring them a fair 
chance to influence the political process, irrespective of their personal 
wealth. It's plausible to believe that many citizens will reciprocate the 
goodwill embodied in these schemes by contributing more readily to 
the well-being of society and by refraining from purely self-seeking 
political behavior. And when they observe public-spirited behavior of 
this sort, still more citizens will be moved to behave in the same way. 
These proposals, then, are another example of how appropriately 
expressive law - even in the form of cash subsidies - can be 
expected to heighten reciprocal cooperation. 
C. Street-Level Policing 
The conventional theory sees crime prevention as just another 
collective-action problem. As a society, we are all better off when we 
universally refrain from theft and like forms of predation. But as indi­
viduals, each one of us is better off free riding on whatever restraint 
our neighbors display while engaging in as much looting and pillaging 
as possible. The obvious solution is to create incentives that align indi­
vidual interests with collective ones - hence, the threat of severe 
criminal punishments for those who break the law.97 
Far from curing the pathology of inner-city crime, however, the 
reliance on severe penalties has been shown to be one of the patholo­
gies. Such penalties convey distrust and animosity on the part of law­
enforcement authorities toward inner-city residents. Inner-city resi­
dents predictably reciprocate by displaying less willingness to cooper­
ate with law-enforcement authorities and less willingness to obey the 
law more generally - making it necessary to enact even more severe 
penalties, which depress reciprocal cooperation all the more.98 
Again, the reciprocity theory suggests the importance of promot­
ing trust, here between citizens and the police. At least certain forms 
of community policing are geared toward doing exactly that. By giving 
citizens a say in how policing is carried out, programs that vest citizens 
96. BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTI, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999); 
BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS (2002). 
97. This is, of course, the economic conception of the "deterrence" theory of criminal 
punishment. See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 
76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). 
98. See George Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen, Gang Behavior, Law Enforcement, and 
Community Values, in VALUES AND PUBLIC POLICY 173 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 1994); 
Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social Regulation, 81 B.U. 
L. REV. 361, 368-69 (2001). 
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with significant authority to supervise and participate in law enforce­
ment evince respect for citizens, who reciprocate by cooperating more 
with the police. Increased cooperation by citizens in turn fosters police 
officers' impression that citizens do in fact trust them, a perception 
that the police reciprocate by regarding citizens as more trustworthy. 
The result is a collaborative style of interaction that ultimately 
strengthens a community's crime-fighting capacity.99 
D. Good Samaritanism 
Breaking with the traditional Anglo-American position, several 
states have recently enacted laws that oblige individuals to assist 
strangers in need when they can do so without risk to themselves. Such 
laws are intended to counter the supposed growing indifference of 
Americans - particularly urban-dwelling ones - toward the well­
being of strangers.100 
But the reciprocity theory warns that such laws may do more to 
construct than to remedy such indifference. Some individuals could 
see the apparent necessity of a penalty for nonassistance as confirma­
tion that most citizens don't genuinely care about strangers' well­
being; those individuals, the reciprocity theory predicts, will respond 
by showing less concern themselves. Financial incentives to assist are 
also likely to obscure morally motivated acts of assistance, thereby 
diluting a signal of good intentions that would otherwise have moved 
individuals to reciprocate in kind. 
Substantial experimental evidence suggests it simply is not the case 
that Americans are disinclined to render assistance to strangers in 
need.1 0 1 The way to strengthen citizens' resolve to render such assis­
tance, the reciprocity theory implies, is to correct the misperception 
that others lack such resolve, a goal that can be achieved through pub­
lic commendations of individuals who engage in heroic behavior. 
CONCLUSION 
The main - indeed, only - selling point of the conventional 
theory of collective action is its asserted behavioral realism. Individu­
als, it tells us, are inherently self-seeking. Accordingly, we can't count 
on them voluntarily to subordinate their material interests to the good 
99. See generally WESLEY G. SKOGAN & SUSAN M. HARTNEIT, COMMUNITY 
POLICING, CHICAGO STYLE (1997). 
100. See Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community of Aid: A Rejoinder to Opponents of 
Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1993). 
101. See BIBB LATANE & JOHN M. DARLEY, THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER: WHY 
DOESN'T HE HELP? (1970) (reporting experimental results showing that failure to intervene 
is attributable to errors in perception especially likely to occur in group settings). 
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of society; rather we must alternately bribe and threaten them through 
a costly regulatory apparatus, the maintenance of which not only 
depletes our common resources but itself creates myriad opportunities 
for advantage seeking by self-interested individuals and groups. It is 
hard to imagine a less inspiring account of our motives and our pros­
pects. But if the ugly picture the conventional theory paints is right, 
then we'd be fools to avert our eyes from it. 
It turns out, however, that the conventional theory isn't right. Indi­
viduals in collective-action settings might not behave like saints, but 
they don't behave like fiends either. They can be counted on to 
contribute to collective goods, the emerging literature on reciprocity 
shows, so long as they perceive that others are inclined to do the same. 
Bribes and threats are not nearly so necessary as the conventional 
theory would have us believe; the law can instead enlist our coopera­
tion by furnishing us with grounds to trust one another to contribute 
our fair share to society's needs. Indeed, when the law relies only on 
bribes and threats, it breeds the impression that citizens can't trust one 
another to contribute to collective goods voluntarily, thereby under­
mining their motivation to reciprocate one another's public spirited­
ness. Whatever truth there is in the conventional theory is an artifact 
of the common acceptance of that theory's bleak assumptions. 
So we should now reject them. To replace the conventional theory 
of collective action, we should construct a new and more appealing 
one founded on our nature as reciprocators. The logic of reciprocity 
not only reflects a more realistic understanding of individual emo­
tional and moral commitments. It makes the hope that citizens will be 
morally and emotionally committed to contribute to the common good 
more realistic. 
